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"WE CAN'T TELL THEM APART": WHEN AND HOW THE
COURT SHOULD EDUCATE JURORS ON THE POTENTIAL
INACCURACIES OF CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATIONS
AARON H. CHIU*
I. INTRODUCTION
In August 1994, McKinley Cromedy was convicted of first-
degree aggravated sexual assault, second-degree robbery, second-
degree burglary, and third-degree terroristic threats.' He was sentenced
to sixty years in prison,2 despite the fact that no forensic evidence
presented at court linked him to the crime. 3 Instead, Cromedy, a black
man, was convicted solely by eyewitness testimony produced by the
victim of the crime, a white woman, who had identified him on the
street nearly eight whole months after the crime occurred.4
At trial, the jurors found Cromedy guilty, apparently satisfied
by the confidence of the victim's testimony. Cromedy appealed the
decision on the basis that he was not permitted to use a special jury
instruction that addressed the difficulties of an eyewitness properly
identifying a member of a different race.6 The Supreme Court of New
Jersey reversed and remanded the conviction on the basis of this issue,
but the jury again found Cromedy guilty of all charges. 7 Cromedy
remained in prison until December 1999, when DNA tests finally
showed that he was not the true perpetrator of the crime; Cromedy had
been wrongly incarcerated for five years before he was released,
despite the victim's certainty that she had correctly identified her
assailant.
8
*J.D., University of Maryland School of Law, 2008.
1. State v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457, 460 (N.J. 1999).
2. See Radha Natarajan, Racialized Memory and Reliability: Due Process Applied to
Cross-Racial Eyewitness Identifications, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1821, 1845 (2003).
3. Cromedy, 727 A.2d at 459-60 ("No forensic evidence linking defendant to the
offenses was presented during the trial. The police did not lift any fingerprints belonging to
defendant from the apartment... [nor could] the genetic markers found in the semen and
spermatozoa ... be said to have come from the defendant .....
4. Natarajan, supra note 2, at 1844-45.
5. Id.
6. Cromedy, 727 A.2d at 458.
7. Natarajan, supra note 2, at 1844-45.
8. Id.
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Criminal convictions hinged upon a cross-racial identification
similar to the one made in the case of Cromedy pose a significant
problem in the American justice system.9 Cross-racial identifications
are identifications in which an eyewitness identifies a member of a
different race.10  Cross-racial identifications prove especially
troublesome when identification occurs when an eyewitness is asked
to identify a person of a different race."
Eyewitness testimonies, in general, are far less reliable than
jurors tend to believe. 2 Courts have acknowledged that cases where
defendants are convicted by the testimony of a single eyewitness
present the greatest danger of erroneous conviction. 13 The Supreme
Court has recognized that eyewitness identifications by members of
different races are even less likely to be accurate than identifications
made by members of the same race.14
Scholars have long studied the subject of cross-racial
identification and the potential errors of jurors convicting innocent
defendants based on identifications made by eyewitnesses of other
races. 15 While scholars have propounded numerous suggestions on
how this subject should be approached in the courtroom, the Supreme
Court has yet to adopt a uniform standard to deal with this problem.' 6
Most jurisdictions defer to the discretion of lower courts on whether
9. Cromedy, 727 A.2d at 460; Brown v. Davis, 752 F.2d 1142, 1146 (6th Cir. 1985).
10. John P. Rutledge, They All Look Alike: The Inaccuracy of Cross-Racial
Identifications, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 207, 211 (2001) (citing Cromedy, 727 A.2d at 461) ("A
cross-racial ID occurs when an eyewitness of one race is asked to identify a particular
individual of another race.").
11. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 72 n.8 (1988); see also Cromedy, 727 A.2d at
464; People v. Radcliffe, 764 N.Y.S.2d 773, 775 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) ("The greatest danger
of conviction of the innocent exists in 'sole eyewitness' cases .... The potential for inaccuracy
in visual identification is well known to the legal community... and has been recognized by
the Supreme Court of the United States .... (citations omitted)).
12. C. Ronald Huff, Wrongful Conviction: Societal Tolerance of Injustice, 4 RES. rN
SOC. PROBS. & PUB. POL'Y 99, 101-03 (1987) (stating that a study implicated mistaken
eyewitness identifications as the cause of more than 60% of the five hundred wrongful
convictions studied); see also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) ("The vagaries
of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances
of mistaken identification.").
13. Radcliffe, 764 N.Y.S.2d at 776 (noting that courts have recognized "that cross-racial
identifications are much less likely to be accurate than same race identifications" (citations
omitted)).
14. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 72 n.8; see also Cromedy, 727 A.2d at 464.
15. See Cromedy, 727 A.2d at 461-62 (compiling authorities).
16. See Natarajan, supra note 2, at 1823-24.
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the topic of difficulties in making cross-racial identifications may be
presented to jurors1 7
II. CURRENT LAWS/RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. Background
1. Studies on "Other Race" Effect
Several academic articles and studies have been written on the
subject of cross-racial identification.' 8 Patrick Wall's classic study of
eyewitness identification 19 includes a dramatic case of erroneous
cross-racial identifications.20  In this study, five victims of a
kidnapping, rape, and robbery episode were each asked to identify the
perpetrator, with whom each victim had spent several hours.2' All five
victims independently identified a man who was later proven to have
been several hundred miles away at the time of the offense.22
However, when authorities apprehended the true criminal, results
showed that the true criminal bore no resemblance, other than the color
of his skin, to the other suspects identified by the victims. 23
Witnesses are often unconsciously influenced by their
subjective expectations.24 Studies have increasingly supported the idea
that some witnesses are better at identifying members of their own
race and that the same witness would be significantly impaired when
asked to identify persons of another race or ethnicity.25 Social
scientists have labeled this tendency using terms such as the "own
race" effect, "other race" effect, or "own race" bias.26
17. See also Rutledge, supra note 10, at 215 (stating that the "denial of a defense request
for a special jury instruction detailing the pitfalls of cross-racial IDs has generally been upheld
on appeal as within the trial court's discretion").
18. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69
CORNELL L. REv. 934, 936 (1984).





24. MICHAEL J. SAKS & REID HASTIE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN COURT 175 (1978).
25. Smith v. State, 880 A.2d 288, 294 (Md. 2005).
26. See Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, The Other-Race Effect in Eyewitness
Identification: What Do We Do About It?, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 230, 230 (2001)
(coining "other-race" effect); Christian A. Meissner & John C. Brigham, Thirty Years of the
2007]
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While studies have yet to show the extent to which the other
race effect may hinder a witness's ability to identify a member of a
different race, a growing body of data suggests that this effect may
indeed be true for some witnesses.28 Many researchers have conducted
facial recognition experiments in controlled laboratory environments.
29
Most often, these studies are conducted by showing subjects
photographs of a number of faces that are later mixed with a new set of
faces at random.3 °
One study has demonstrated that when shown a new face,
eyewitnesses are 56% more likely to incorrectly believe they have seen
it before if the face is of a race different from their own.31 Another
study reported that people who tried to identify persons of another race
made four times as many errors as those who attempted to identify
members of their own race. 32 Many of these studies have shown the
consistency of the own race bias effect across racial and ethnic
groups.
33
In addition, there are other perceptions that may cause an
eyewitness to remember a perpetrator of a crime incorrectly,
34
including prejudicial attitudes that a witness might have toward a
members outside of their race.35 In one experiment, Professor Gordon
Allport showed his students a photograph of a white man holding a36
straight razor towards a black man in a threatening manner. A
majority of the students, however, later recalled the photo as one in
which the black man held the razor.
3 7
Own-Race Bias in Memory for Faces: A Meta-Analytical Review, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L.
3, 4 (2001) (coining "own race" effect and "own race" bias).
27. State v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457, 462 (N.J. 1999).
28. Rutledge, supra note 10, at 210.
29. Siegfried Ludwig Sporer, The Cross-Race Effect: Beyond Recognition of Faces in
the Laboratory, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 170, 173 (2001); see also Johnson, supra note
18, at 938 (describing a typical laboratory experiment in face recognition).
30. Johnson, supra note 18, at 938.
31. Meissner & Brigham, supra note 26, at 4.
32. Johnson, supra note 18, at 943 (citing Rahaim & Brodsky, Empirical Evidence
Versus Common Sense: Juror and Lawyer Knowledge of Eyewitness Accuracy, 7 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REv. 1, 2 (1982)).
33. Meissner & Brigham, supra note 26, at 5 ("Several of these reviews have also
examined the consistency of the ORB effect across racial/ethnic groups.").
34. Rutledge, supra note 10, at 209-11.
35. See Meissner & Brigham, supra note 26, at 7 ("Early research indicated that racial
attitudes appeared to influence the degree of stereotypic likeness assigned to other-race
members.").
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It should be carefully noted, however, that one's racial attitude
is not the only factor that plays a role in the other race effect.38 This
problem is significant because both courts and jurors may incorrectly
assume that cross-racial identification only presents a problem if the
witness making the identification is shown to harbor racist attitudes.
39
Currently, the causes of the other race effect are still unknown,
40
although many theories have been explored.41
Given the lack of conclusive factual data, many judges are
reluctant to allow the issue of cross-racial identification to be
introduced at trial.42 In addition, courts also hesitate to allow
discussion of the issue due to its possible racially inflammatory
43nature.
2. Effects on Jurors
Several factors may lead a juror to give improper weight to
eyewitness testimony. One problem with eyewitness testimony is that
jurors generally tend to believe eyewitness accounts and take them at
face value, even in "extremely doubtful" circumstances. 44 Juries
naturally want to "punish [someone for] a vicious crime. ' '45 The results
of one survey showed that 75% of prosecutors and 56% of jury-
eligible citizens incorrectly believed that confident witnesses are more
likely to be accurate.46 For example, when an eyewitness "exclaims
with conviction" that the defendant is the perpetrator of that crime, a
38. See Meissner & Brigham, supra note 26, at 7.
39. See id.
40. Steven M. Smith et al., Postdictors of Eyewitness Errors: Can False Identifications
be Diagnosed in the Cross-Race Situation?, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 153, 165-67 (2001).
41. See, e.g., Meissner & Brigham, supra note 26, at 6-13; see also Smith, 880 A.2d
288, 297 (Md. 2005) (listing three possible theories that have been suggested in order to
explain the existence of the cross-racial effect. One theory suggested that individuals "with
prejudicial attitudes toward members outside of their race were more likely to exhibit own-
race bias." A second theory suggested that "people exhibit own-race bias because members of
a particular race have similar characteristics making it difficult to differentiate among the
members." A third theory suggests that the "number of interracial contacts may play a role in
the extent of own-race bias demonstrated by a particular individual.").
42. Johnson, supra note 18, at 963-64.
43. See id. at 936 ("Furthermore, many judges may fear that merely to mention race in a
criminal case is to stir racial animosity.").
44. Id. at 946.
45. Rutledge, supra note 10, at 208-09 (quoting Kampshoffv. Smith, 698 F.2d 581, 585
(2d Cir. 1983)).
46. Steven Penrod & Brian Cutler, Witness Confidence and Witness Accuracy:
Assessing Their Forensic Relation, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 817, 818 (1995).
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juror may ignore his or her own doubt over the strength of the
evidence of the defendant's guilt and convict the defendant.
This problem is compounded with cross-racial identifications
in eyewitness testimonies. In 1984, Sheryl Johnson of Cornell
University wrote that many "laymen" and lawyers do not even find
cross-racial identification to be a difficult problem in determining the
credibility of eyewitness accounts.48 One study in particular found that
only 58% of "laymen" expressed an understanding of the "other race"
effect.
49
In this study,50 500 students were asked the following question:
Two women are walking to school one morning, one of
them is an Asian and the other white. Suddenly, two
men, one black and one white, jump into their path and
attempt to grab their purses. Later, the women are
shown photographs of known purse snatchers in the
area. Which statement best describes your view of the
women's ability to identify the purse snatchers?
51
The study showed that 13% of the test subjects incorrectly
believed that "[t]he white woman will find the black man easier to
identify than the white man,"52 and 29% even felt that either "[b]oth
the Asian and the white woman will find the white man harder to
identify than the black man,, 53 or that "[t]he Asian woman will have
an easier time than the white woman making an accurate identification
of both men."
54
This misunderstanding of cross-racial identifications indicates
that prospective jurors may not be properly educated regarding
potential errors caused by cross-racial identifications. A juror who is
generally uneducated about the potential inaccuracies of the other race
effect in eyewitness testimonies may not be properly equipped with the
knowledge to adequately assess the facts at trial.55 Many jurisdictions
47. Rutledge, supra note 10, at 208-09 (quoting Kampshoff, 698 F.2d at 585).
48. See Johnson, supra note 18, at 946-49.
49. See id. at 947.
50. ELIZABETH LoFTus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 172-73 (1979).




55. See Rutledge, supra note 10, at 224 (quoting State v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457, 460
(N.J. 1999) ("A jury instruction that contains no direct reference to the hidden fires of
prejudice and bias ... and fails to call the jury's attention to the problems of cross-racial
420 [VOL. 7:2
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have yet to set a clear procedure in determining when and how to




There are numerous suggestions for providing the defendants
with opportunities to neutralize the errors that the other race effect
may produce.57 Unfortunately, many of the traditional protections
inadequately protect against identification errors of the potential other
race effect.
Many scholars strongly support the idea of allowing the
defense to include expert testimony as the best solution to educate the
jurors of cross-racial identification. 59 Few trial judges, however,
permit this option at trial.60 Instead, "many courts reject expert
psychological testimony as 'a superfluous attempt to put the gloss of
expertise, like a bit of frosting, upon inferences which lay persons
were equally capable of drawing from the evidence."' 61 Other tools,
such as cross-examinations, closing arguments, and special jury
instructions, may better serve defendants.
Traditionally, cross-examination was one of the only available
methods in many jurisdictions that allowed the defense to expose
62issues of cross-racial identification. Yet some "research indicates that
it may not be as effective as intended.' ' 63 While this approach may call
into question the reliability of eyewitness identification, it is unclear
whether jurors' decisions are improved as a result.64 In addition, cross-
identification, so well documented... denies minority defendants.., their constitutional right
to a fair trial.").
56. Cf Natarajan, supra note 2, at 1823-24.
57. See e.g., Johnson, supra note 18, at 951 ("The own-race effect would be of little
concern if defense counsel had adequate techniques for revealing and neutralizing the errors it
produces.").
58. Id.
59. Id. at 958-59.
60. See Natarajan, supra note 2, at 1832-33 n.67-70 nd accompanying text.
61. Rutledge, supra note 10, at 215 (quoting State v. Kemp, 507 A.2d 1387, 1390
(Conn. 1986) (citations omitted)).
62. Id. at 214-15; see also United States v. Curry, 977 F.2d 1042, 1052 (7th Cir. 1992)
(expressing that "vigorous cross-examination by the [defense] exposed the weakness of the
[eyewitness] identifications"); United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir. 1982)
(finding no error in excluding expert testimony regarding eyewitness examinations because
the accuracy of the identification "can be adequately addressed in cross-examination and [] the
jury can adequately weigh these problems through common-sense evaluation").
63. Rutledge, supra note 10, at 214-15.
64. Id. at 215.
2007]
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examination proves to be ineffective if the eyewitness believes that he
or she has a good memory of faces of other races.
65
Another alternative is to allow the defense counsel to address
the subject of cross-racial identifications and its difficulties in its
closing argument. 66 Courts, however, may prohibit the defense from
mentioning the difficulties of cross-racial identification because they
deem it "racially inflammatory., 67 Additionally, there may also be a
"lack of factual foundation for such arguments," as "[b]oth defense
attorneys and prosecutors are limited to arguments of facts in evidence
or inferences from those facts. 68
Finally, the issue of cross-racial identification may be
addressed in special jury instructions given to jurors before they reach
a decision.69 While this approach has yet to gain wide acceptance, 70 it
has been recently required in some circumstances in at least one
jurisdiction.71 It is difficult to determine how often this approach is
used in other jurisdictions,72 but a majority of jurisdictions hold that
the decision of whether to utilize this approach is largely left to the
discretion of the trial court.73 Courts may deny the use of specific jury
instructions if the victim was terrorized in broad daylight 74 or if
numerous eyewitnesses identified the defendant at close range.75
Jury instructions, however, may be inadequate for a number of
reasons. For example, they may not convey any psychological data or
may inaccurately convey that the other race "may not operate where
the witness has had interracial experiences." 76 On the other hand, a
more detailed jury instruction "may be criticized for focusing on one
source of identification error., 7
7
65. Johnson, supra note 18, at 953; see also Smith, 880 A.2d 288, 300 (Md. 2005).
66. Johnson, supra note 18, at 955-57.
67. Id. at 955.
68. Id. at 956.
69. Rutledge, supra note 10, at 215.
70. Id.
71. See e.g., State v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457, 459 (N.J. 1999) (holding that "the trial
court's failure to submit to the jury an instruction similar to the one requested by defendant
requires a reversal of defendant's convictions").
72. Rutledge, supra note 10, at 224.
73. Id.
74. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Hyatt, 647 N.E.2d 1168, 1171 (Mass. 1995).
75. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Engram, 686 N.E.2d 1080, 1082 (Mass. 1997).
76. Johnson, supra note 18, at 976 (critiquing Judge Bazelon's proposed jury instruction
in United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 561 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring)).
77. Id.
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4. Legal Background in Other Jurisdictions
i. Case Law in Other Jurisdictions
Despite the numerous studies that have been conducted on the
other race effect, very little case law exists regarding the use of cross-
racial identification by the defendant. A handful of decisions
acknowledge the difficulties of cross-racial identifications in
eyewitness testimonies, 78 but the actual implementation of the various
courtroom mechanisms to defend against erroneous testimonies is
largely discretionary.79
Prior to the development of cases that focused on cross-racial
identifications, one of the leading cases in determining the
admissibility of general eyewitness testimonies was Manson v.
Brathwaite.80 In Manson, the court established a two-prong test for
eyewitness testimonies. 81 First, the court must determine whether the
confrontation procedure is suggestive.82 Second, the court must
determine whether the identification still "possesses certain features of
reliability" by examining five factors.83 These factors include (1) the
opportunity of the witness to view the perpetrator at the time of the
crime, (2) the degree of attention the witness paid to the perpetrator
during the crime, (3) the accuracy of her initial description of the
offender, (4) the level of certainty demonstrated at initial
identification, and (5) the time elapsed between the crime and the
confrontation.84 While Manson does not provide direct assistance
regarding cross-racial identification specifically, it lists several
relevant factors to consider in any identification testimony.85
Years later, in State v. Cromedy, 86 New Jersey adopted a
definitive approach for determining when to allow the subject of cross-
racial identification to be included in jury instructions. 87 In Cromedy,
the defendant McKinley Cromedy appealed his initial conviction of
78. See, e.g., State v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457, 464 (N.J. 1999) ("The Supreme Court of
the United States has acknowledged that problems exist with eyewitness identifications in
general and cross-racial identifications in particular.").
79. Id.
80. 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
81. Id. at 110.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 110, 114-16.
84. Id. at 114-16.
85. However, Radha Natarajan has offered a test developed from the Manson test for
determining when a cross-racial identification testimony should be admitted as evidence.
Natarajan, supra note 2, at 1846-54.
86. 727 A.2d 457 (N.J. 1999).
87. Id. at 458.
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rape and robbery on the basis that a substantial agreement in the
scientific community on the topic of cross-racial identification
warrants a special jury instruction.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey ruled that "a cross-racial
instruction should be given only when.., identification is a critical
issue in the case, and an eyewitness's cross-racial identification is not




The lack of positive identification for nearly eight months after the
incident's occurrence raised some concern about its reliability.9" The
court argued that under those circumstances, the jury may have been
unable to evaluate the reliability of the eyewitness without a briefing
on the potential errors in cross-racial identifications.
9 1
However, as previously mentioned, even the specific jury
instruction proved to be inadequate in protecting the innocent
defendant. When the case was remanded to the jury, McKinley
Cromedy was still found guilty.
92
ii. Pattern Instructions in Other Jurisdictions
Although the Cromedy decision allowed special jury
instructions to be used in some cases involving cross-racial
identifications, it failed to provide rigid guidelines for the wording of
such instructions. 93 Currently, only a handful of jurisdictions have
pattern instructions for cross-racial identification situations. These
jurisdictions vary in their approaches to formulating pattern
instructions. Some jurisdictions include long and detailed instructions,
while other jurisdictions only include a single line.94
The most well-known special jury instruction for cases
involving cross-racial identification was suggested by Judge Bazelon
in the case United States v. Telfaire.95 The instruction reads:
In this case the identifying witness is of a different race
than the defendant. In the experience of many it is more
difficult to identify members of a different race than
88. Id. at 460-61.
89. Id. at 467.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Natarajan, supra note 2, at 1844-45.
93. See generally Cromedy, 727 A.2d at 457. New Jersey has since adopted a cross-
racial identification charge. Rutledge, supra note 10, at 226-27.
94. Currently, New Jersey uses the most detailed pattern instruction with a full
paragraph and footnotes, while California uses only a few words.
95. 469 F.2d 552, 561 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
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members of one's own. If this is also your own
experience, you may consider it in evaluating the
witness's testimony. You must also consider, of course,
whether there are other factors present in this case
which overcome any such difficulty of identification.
For example, you may conclude that the witness has
had sufficient contacts with members of the defendant's
race that he would not have greater difficulty in making
a reliable identification.
96
While this instruction is sometimes used in various jurisdictions, 97
Judge Bazelon's instruction also has its share of critics.
Currently, only New Jersey, California, and North Carolina
have specific language regarding cross-racial identifications in their
pattern jury instructions. In California, the instructions only provide
for a one line description of the "cross-racial or ethnic nature" of the
identification. 99 In contrast, the New Jersey's pattern instructions are
much more detailed:
The fact that an identifying witness is not of the same
race as the perpetrator and/or defendant, and whether
that fact might have had an impact on the accuracy of
the witness' original perception, and/or the accuracy of
the subsequent identification. You should consider that
in ordinary human experience, people may have greater
difficulty in accurately identifying members of a
different race. °°
In addition, the New Jersey instruction includes a pair of
footnotes.' 0' Finally, North Carolina adopted a unique approach: its
pattern jury instructions do not include a model, but instead an
96. Id.
97. Johnson, supra note 18, at 977-78. Most of the federal circuit courts have approved
of Judge Bazelon's instruction, except for the Fifth and Eleventh circuits, which have not ruled
on the issue. State courts, however, have generally been less receptive. None of the state
courts specifically require the use of Judge Bazelon's instruction.
98. Id. at 978.
99. CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS - Criminal 2.92 (West, Westlaw through Fall 2006
edition).
100. See New Jersey Model Criminal Jury Charges; Identification: In Court Identification
Only (8) (West, Westlaw through 1999 revision).
101. Id.
2007]
426 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS
attorney may request such an instruction on cross-racial identification
by submitting a special form."°2
B. Developments in Maryland
1. Smith v. State
10 3
i. Facts
The courts in Maryland have only recently ruled on the use of
cross-racial identification by the defendant in jury trials. In Smith v.
State, a white female was nearly robbed by two black males as she
parked her car in front of her residence in Baltimore City.' 04 The
incident occurred during the evening, but the victim alleged that the
street lights allowed her to see the perpetrators clearly.' 0 During the
altercation, the two men attempted to obtain the keys from her.
0 6
However, one of the victim's neighbors saw the incident from her
window, causing the two assailants to leave the scene.1
07
Police responded to the neighbor's call, but were unable to
locate the two perpetrators. 18 The victim provided a general
description of the men, including a statement that the man with the gun
had "dreds."' 10 9 The victim was unable to identify the perpetrators from
various photograph arrays until two weeks after the incident when she
identified the photographs of the two defendants as the men who
to rob her." Both men were subsequently arrested.attempted t rbhri0otmeweesbqu larsed"
Defendants James Smith and Jason Mack were charged with
"Attempted Armed Robbery, First and Second Degree Assault,
Carrying a Handgun and Use of a Handgun in Commission of a Crime,
and Attempted Theft." ' 1 2 Prior to the jury trial, the defendants
submitted a motion in limine, "requesting that the jury be instructed on
102. N.C. Crim. Prac. Forms § 27:9 (West, Westlaw through 5th ed.).
103. 880 A.2d 288 (Md. 2005).
104. Id. at 289.
105. Id. at 291.






112. Id. at 290-91
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cross-racial eyewitness identification to enable the parties to raise the
issue in opening statements."' 13 The trial judge denied the motion. 14
During the trial, the State provided three witnesses. 15 The
victim's neighbor testified that she did not have a clear view of the
perpetrators of the crime. " 6 The detective assigned to the case testified
that the victim had "stated with certainty" that the two defendants were
the men who attempted to rob her.' 
17
The victim, however, testified in great detail about how she
was able to identify the defendants as the perpetrators of the crime.'
l 1
The victim provided a description of how she remembered the
perpetrators, which fit both of the defendants. 19 When asked why she
felt confident that her identifications were accurate, the victim testified
that she was "extremely good with faces."' 2 ° She further volunteered
that she was a teacher that watched "lay mannerisms," and that she had
been studying art and painting people since she was a child.'
2 1
The defendants requested on two subsequent occasions that
they be allowed to argue cross-racial identification in their closing, but
the trial judge denied both requests. 22 The jury then found the
defendants guilty of attempted robbery, second degree assault, and
attempted theft. 23 Both defendants appealed on the basis that the trial
court abused its discretion by refusing to allow cross-racial
identification to be used either in the closing argument or in the jury
instruction. 124 The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court. 125 The defendants filed a petition for a writ of certiorari
to the Court of Appeals to consider whether the trial judge erred in
"refusing to instruct the jury on cross-racial identification" and
"precluding [the] defense counsel from discussing in their closing
arguments the difficulties of cross-racial identification.'
126







120. ld. at 292.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 292-93.
123. Id. at 293.
124. Id.
125. Smith v. State, 857 A.2d 1198, 1999 (Md. 2004).
126. Smith, 880 A.2d at 293.
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ii. The Court's Reasoning
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to review both of the
issues raised by the defendants. 127 The court, however, only reached a
decision on the question of the use of cross-racial identifications in
closing arguments. 128 Writing for the majority, Judge Lynne A.
Battaglia held that in a case in which the sole eyewitness voluntarily
bolstered her own face recognition credentials, the defendants were
entitled to have the opportunity to argue the difficulties of cross-racial
identification in their closing argument.' 2 9
Judge Battaglia acknowledged that at the time of the decision,
no conclusive studies on the subject clearly established cross-racial
identification as a "matter of common knowledge."' 130 Yet because
"the victim's identification of the defendants was anchored" in the
victim's self-proclaimed adeptness at recognizing faces, the defense
should have been allowed to rebut the identification by introducing the
difficulties of cross-racial identifications.' 31
Judge Glenn T. Harrell, Jr. followed with a dissenting opinion,
to which Judges Alan M. Wilner and Clayton Greene both joined. 132
Judge Harrell listed several reasons for disagreeing with the
majority. 33 First, the defendants failed to present any evidence that
demonstrated a specific deficiency in the victim's ability to recognize
and identify members of another race. 134 Second, Judge Harrell
remained skeptical of the current research and academia conducted on
problems with cross-racial identification.' 35 Finally, the dissent also
questioned the majority, because while the victim presented testimony
to bolster her ability in recognizing faces, she did not make any
mention of an "enhanced ability" to recognize people of different
races. 136
2. Other Developments
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals expanded on the ruling
of Smith and addressed the issue of special jury instructions in Janey v.
127. Id.




132. Id. (Harrell, J., dissenting).
133. Id.
134. Jd. at 301.
135. Id. at 302.
136. Id. at 304.
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State.137 In Janey, an African American's conviction of second-degree
murder and obstruction of justice hinged upon the testimony of his
long-time friend who was under a grant of immunity. 138 One of the
corroborating witnesses for the prosecution was a non-African
American eyewitness who identified the defendant as a party at a
scene in which the perpetrator was allegedly present.'
39
On cross-examination, the witness admitted that he had trouble
identifying African Americans.140 The defense, without mentioning
race, emphasized the unreliability of the witness's identification in the
closing argument.' 4 ' The defense then requested that the trial court
administer a special jury instruction that addressed the "reliability of
cross-racial identification," which the trial judge refused to do. 142
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals upheld the decision
and deferred to the judge's discretion. 143 The Court of Special Appeals
noted that while the Smith court focused on a defendant's right to use
cross-racial identification in closing arguments, it did not impose any
duty upon trial judges to use special jury instructions in similar
cases. Nonetheless, the Court of Special Appeals suggested that
pattern instructions would be helpful' I and called for the Court of
Appeals to provide more guidance over this subject in the future. 146
III. ANALYSIS
A. Evaluating the Available Remedies
There are four commonly suggested remedies for safeguarding
potentially erroneous identifications made between members of
different races. 147 Of the four remedies, which include cross-
examination, closing arguments, special jury instructions, and expert
137. 891 A.2d 355, 356 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006).
138. Id. at 356-57.
139. Id. at 357-58.
140. Id. at 358.
141. Id. at 364, n.1.
142. Id. at 359.
143. Id. at 367.
144. Id. at 365.
145. Id. at 368.
146. Id. (quoting Smith v. State, 857 A.2d 1198 (Md. 2004) (stating that "it would be
helpful if the Court of Appeals provided guidance as to when and under what circumstances" a
trial court may discuss cross-racial identifications).
147. See supra Part II.a.iii.
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testimony, cross-examination is the most likely to be allowed, and
expert testimony is the least likely. 148 Because no jurisdiction has
imposed criteria for when expert testimony must be used, this
discussion will only focus on the other three remedies: cross-
examination, closing arguments, and special jury instructions.
Those who oppose the implementation of protective measures
with regard to cross-racial identification cases may argue that the
defendant has an adequate opportunity to uncover a witness's potential
impairment by use of cross-examination. 149 In a case like Janey v.
State, cross-examination can be very effective, 150 as the defense
counsel immediately uncovered the witness's difficulty in identifying
African Americans. In simpler cases like Janey, where the eyewitness
testimony is not the sole charging evidence and the witness has already
volunteered that the identification may not be reliable, 151 the defense
counsel has adequate means to protect itself from inaccurate
testimony.
Smith v. State, however, demonstrates that cross-examinations
may serve the opposite of the desired effect.1 52 A witness can bolster
her credibility with regard to people recognition, and the jurors thus
may be influenced to credit the witness with greater reliability than
they may have been inclined to credit before. Smith permits a
defendant to include statements in the closing argument about the
potential inaccuracies caused by the other race effect in certain
situations. 153 Chief among those situations is when there is a cross-
racial identification and the evidence against the defendant is anchored
by the witness's volunteered credentials.
15 4
The second available remedy for cross-racial identifications
involves permitting the defendant's counsel to address the issue of
cross-racial identification during closing arguments. 5 5 Smith v. State
required judges to allow defendants to reference the potential
inaccuracies of cross-racial identifications when an eyewitness
voluntarily offers information that bolsters her own ability to
distinguish faces.'56 Yet closing arguments may not be the ideal
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. 891 A.2d 355 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006).
151. Id.
152. 880 A.2d 288 (Md. 2005).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 300.
155. See supra Part 11.a.iii.
156. Smith, 880 A.2d at 300.
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solution to the problems of cross-racial identifications; jurors may feel
pressured to ignore even the most persuasive arguments addressing
cross-racial identifications because of a lack of testimony or other
evidence supporting such claims. 1
57
Because Smith has set criteria in Maryland for situations where
judges are required to allow the topic of cross-racial identifications to
be addressed in the closing argument, the next logical step is for the
courts in Maryland to determine when it should require special jury
instructions. Special jury instructions more accurately address issues in
cross-racial identifications' 58 but are less likely to be accepted by trial
judges. 159 In addition, Smith permitted special jury instructions to be
used to address cross-racial identifications, but did not set guidelines
about when they should be used.
160
B. When the Court Should Use Special Jury Instructions
Although the court in Smith v. State failed to rule on the issue
of requiring a special jury instruction in cases involving a cross-racial
identification, it permitted such instructions to be used. 6' A few
jurisdictions already include instructions regarding cross-racial
identifications, although only New Jersey has explicitly ruled on when
the instruction must be used. 162 Unfortunately, even if Maryland
drafted a special jury instruction, it currently lacks guidance as to
when it would be appropriate to use this instruction.'
63
Radha Natarajan has proposed a specific test, based on the one
adopted in Manson v. Braithwaite, for when cross-racial identifications
should be admissible as evidence. 164 First, Natarajan suggests that the
court ask the degree of other race effect on the witness making the
identification. 165 If the degree of the other race effect was low, then the
next question is whether there were suggestive procedures.' 66 If there
were no suggestive procedures, then Natarajan suggests that the
157. Johnson, supra note 18, at 957.
158. See supra Part l.a.iii.
159. Id.
160. See Janey v. State, 891 A.2d 355, 367-68 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006) (discussing
Smith v. State, 857 A.2d 1198 (Md. 2004)).
161. Id.
162. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
163. See Janey, 891 A.2dat 368.
164. Natarajan, supra note 2, at 1848, Figure B.
165. Id. at 1848.
166. Id.
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eyewitness testimony should be admitted. 167 If there were suggestive
procedures, Natarajan suggests that the court should move on to a
second question.1
68
What was the degree of
Own-Race Effect?
Were there suggestive High
procedures?
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What was the degree of own-
race effect?
Shg0hort viewing time and
og retention interval
Is it still reliable?
Consider:
-Is there corroborating evidence?
-Were there procedural safeguards
used?
Is there enough to bring
confidence to the identification?
WihcAdmitia Exclude I
With cross-racialjury instructions and
expert testimony on
the own-race effect.
Figure 2. Natarajan's Proposed Test for Admissibility of Cross-Racial
Identifications: Focus on When Own-Race Effect is Great
If the degree of other race effect was high, or if there were
suggestive procedures involved in the eyewitness testimony, Natarajan
suggests the court should ask if the identification is still reliable.' 70 If
the identification was reliable, the testimony should be admitted. 7' If
the identification was not reliable, however, the identification should
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This test may be adapted and applied to questions regarding
when a special jury instruction should be administered, 173 and it is
consistent with recent court decisions in Maryland and other
jurisdictions. 174 First, if the degree of other race effect was low and
there were no suggestive procedures, then a special jury instruction
would not be required. 175 If the degree of other race effect was low,
and there were suggestive procedures, such as in Cromedy and Smith,
the issue would qualify for the next part of the test.
176
The second part of the test holds that if the identification had a
high degree of other race effect or if there were suggestive procedures,
the court should then ask if the identification was reliable. 77 Cases
similar to Janey v. State, where the identification was only part of the
evidence corroborating another witness's testimony, 178 should not
require special jury instructions because the identification was not a
critical issue in the case. 179 Identifications in which the victim was
terrorized in broad daylight, or when numerous eyewitnesses identified
the defendant at close range' are also arguably reliable
identifications, and also may not require special jury instructions.' 81
State v. Cromedy falls into the fourth category of cases,
however. In Cromedy, while there may not have been proof to show
that there was a high degree of other race effect involved, the
identification was suggestive because the jury convicted Cromedy
based on the identification. 182 The identification was also unreliable
because there was no other evidence to corroborate that the defendant
identified was the perpetrator.183 The Supreme Court of New Jersey
held that a special jury instruction was necessary because the jury may
have been unable to evaluate the reliability of the witness without the
insights of the special instruction.184
173. Id. at 1849.
174. See generally Janey v. State, 891 A.2d 355 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006); Smith v.
State, 880 A.2d 288 (Md. 2005); State v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457 (N.J. 1999).
175. See Natarajan, supra note 2, at 1848.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. 891 A.2d 355.
179. See id. at 367.
180. See supra Part II.a.iii.
181. See id.
182. Natarajan, supra note 2, at 1844-45.
183. Seeid.
184. State v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457, 467 (N.J. 1999).
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Along this line of reasoning, the Maryland Court of Appeals
also should have required a special jury instruction in Smith v. State.1 85
Like Cromedy, the defense counsel did not offer any evidence that
there was a high degree of other race effect that may have influenced
the witness. 16-Yet unlike Cromedy, the identification in Smith was
even more suggestive because the witness claimed to possess a skill
above normal in recognizing faces.' 87 With such information
volunteered to the jury, the jurors likely would have had a more
difficult time evaluating the reliability of the witness without being
educated of the potential identification errors caused by the other race
effect. Therefore, the Court of Appeals should have permitted the
subject of cross-racial identification in the jury instructions, as it
allowed in the closing argument.
C. Wording of the Jury Instructions
Finally, if Maryland elects to formally adopt special jury
instructions on cross-racial identifications into its procedures, it must
also consider how the instructions should be worded in order to most
effectively educate jurors.
There are currently three jurisdictions that have language in
their pattern jury instructions that address the problems in cross-racial
identifications' 8 8 that Maryland may look to for guidance in
constructing its own instruction. The California instruction includes as
little as one line, while the New Jersey instruction includes a full
paragraph. 189 The North Carolina instruction does not contain specific
language in the actual jury instructions, but provides a form for
defense counsel to request jury instructions.' 90
The California instruction hardly seems to sufficiently educate
a juror of an issue of which 58% of laymen have an incorrect
understanding.' 9' Meanwhile, the New Jersey instruction is more
complete than Judge Bazelon's suggested instruction in United States
v. Telfaire.192 Although it does not convey any psychological data, the
New Jersey instruction frames the cross-racial identification issue in a
185. Smith v. State, 880 A.2d 288 (Md. 2005).
186. Id. at 291.
187. ld. at 300.
188. See supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 100-102 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
192. 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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fairly neutral manner and does not state any inaccurate information. 193
If Maryland intends to adequately pursue the formulation of a specific
pattern jury instruction for cross-racial identifications, it should aim to
follow the pattern of New Jersey, despite its relative verbosity.
Maryland may also consider including psychological data in its
jury instruction; although in doing so, it must also maintain
neutrality. 194 The inclusion of psychological data would not only make
the Maryland instructions more complete than the instructions of the
other three jurisdictions, but may also encourage other states to include
similar language. While opponents of such an instruction may criticize
this wording for both its verbosity and focus on one source of
identification error,1 95 the benefits of such an instruction would
outweigh these concerns.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals of Maryland undertook great
responsibility in following New Jersey and recognizing the right of a
defendant to the other race effect theory argument when a cross-racial
identification is a critical element of the case. With that responsibility
comes the expectation that the Court of Appeals will continue to
provide guidance to its lower courts and courts in other jurisdictions as
to when courts should be required to allow defendants to protect
themselves from potentially erroneous cross-racial identifications.
While the decision of the Court of Special Appeals in Janey v. State
permitted the use of special jury instructions, Maryland's highest court
has yet to break its silence on how and when this measure is to be
used.196 However, with the opening that the Court of Appeals provided
in Smith v. State, this is an issue that the Court of Appeals will
hopefully resolve in the near future.
193. See Johnson, supra note 18, at 976 (noting that one criticism of Judge Bazelon's
suggested instruction is that it "conveys inaccurate information by suggesting that the own-
race effect may not operate where the witness has had interracial experiences").
194. See supra Part II.a.iii.
195. See id.
196. See supra Part 11(b) (stating the various legal developments in Maryland on the
subject of cross-racial identification).
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